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Tuesday, February 28, 2017

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 6 opinion(s) today (and 21 NFP memorandum decision(s))

For publication opinions today (6):

In Danielle Maple v. Travis Maple , a 13-page opinion, Chief Judge Vaidik writes:

In order to have a child-support order modified, the parent seeking modification must prove that either there was a change in circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the prior order unreasonable, or that at least twelve months have passed since the issuance of the prior order and that the amount of support would change by more than 20% from the prior order. Our Supreme Court has held that when a parent relies on a change in income as a basis for modification but the change in support would not be more than 20%, that parent must prove that one or more other factors “converged” with the change in income to establish the requisite “substantial and continuing” change. It is an uncommon occurrence for a parent to meet this burden.

In this case, Father requested that the trial court modify his child-support obligation based on changes in his and Mother’s incomes and other factors. He argued that these changes “converged” to established a change in circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the prior order unreasonable. The trial court recalculated Father’s support obligation, which differed by less than 20% from the prior order. The court issued the modified child-support order, citing changed circumstances as the basis for modification. Mother appeals.

One of the changed circumstances relied upon by Father and the trial court is that Mother’s legal duty of support for her prior-born child was set by the trial court at $66 per week instead of $121, as represented on the prior-born child’s child-support worksheet. That worksheet was still in effect and was not subject to review in these proceedings. Concluding that the trial court erred when it set Mother’s legal duty of support for her prior-born child at an amount lower than what was on her child-support worksheet and that Father has not otherwise proven a change in circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the prior order unreasonable, we reverse and remand with instructions.

In Blaine Boyland, Amy L. Boyland, David K. Jones, and Susan E. Jones v. Castle Farms, Inc., a 20-page opinion, Judge Brown writes:
Blaine and Amy L. Boyland and David and Susan Jones appeal the trial court’s findings of fact, conclusions, and judgment in favor of Castle Farms, Inc., (“Castle Farms”) regarding title to certain real property. They raise several issues which we consolidate and restate as whether the court’s judgment is clearly erroneous. We affirm.
In Alan Mizen v. State of Indiana ex rel. Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, a 24-page opinion, Judge Riley writes:
Appellant-Defendant, Alan Mizen (Mizen), appeals the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Appellee-Plaintiff, State of Indiana ex rel. Curtis Hill, Attorney General of Indiana (State), as well as the denial of his own motion for summary judgment. * * *

[Issues] (1) Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the State because its claim is barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the State because the Attorney General does not have statutory authority to pursue special audit costs; and (3) Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the State under the Crime Victims Relief Act (CVRA) because the State did not suffer a pecuniary loss. * * *

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the State because it filed its CVRA claim within the twoyear statute of limitations based on the discovery rule, and the State is entitled to recover, as a matter of law, the $54,978.41 in additional audit costs that were expended, along with treble damages under the CVRA (as reduced by the restitution already paid) in the amount of $687,082.16, plus reasonable attorney fees and costs.

In State of Indiana v. C.K., a 10-page opinion, Sr. Judge Sharpnack writes:
In this interlocutory appeal, the State of Indiana challenges the juvenile court’s denial of the State’s petition for the court to waive jurisdiction over C.K. in two cases * * *

We conclude C.K.’s felony conviction qualified as a prior felony for purposes of Indiana Code section 31-30-3-6. When both elements of the statute have been established, the “juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction.” Id. If the word “shall” is used, it is construed as mandatory language creating a statutory right to a particular outcome after certain conditions are met. Alden v. State, 983 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. As a result, we reverse the juvenile court’s judgment and remand with instructions to grant the State’s petition for waiver.

In Ricky Johnson v. State of Indiana, an 18-page opinion, Judge Brown writes:
Ricky Johnson appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a level 4 felony. Johnson raises two issues which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence obtained pursuant to a protective sweep. We reverse. * * *

We conclude that the protective sweep was improper and that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the gun discovered in the apartment.

In Neil C. Albee v. State of Indiana, a 15-page opinion, Judges Barnes writes:
Neil Albee appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony voyeurism and Class B misdemeanor residential entry. We reverse. * * *

The circumstances surroundings Schuerger’s pre-trial identification of Albee were unnecessarily suggestive, and those identifications were so unreliable that Albee’s right to due process was abridged when the trial court admitted his identifications into evidence. The evidence as a whole, however, was sufficient to support Albee’s convictions for voyeurism and residential entry. Retrial would not offend double jeopardy principles. We reverse.

NFP civil decisions today (6):

Reta M. Hollowell v. Donald Hollowell (mem. dec.)

In the Matter of the Marriage of: Jeffrey E. Nelson v. Julie A. Nelson (mem. dec.)

In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of T.T.H. (Minor Child), N.M.H. v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: W.H. (Minor Child) and G.H. (Mother) & D.H. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: C.K. (a minor child), and E.K. (mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem.dec.)

In the Matter of: J.D., T.D. and H.F., Children Alleged to be in Need of Services, C.C. (Mother) and R.M. v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

NFP juvenile and criminal decisions today (15):

Lisa Crawford v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Milton D. Horton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Breon M. Davenport v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Lucas Thomas v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Nicholas Matthew Holmes v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Kashif Allen Weathers v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Zackary L. Schulz v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Jerry C. Wilson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Terry L. Abbott v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Timothy F. Watkins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Keith Gwaltney v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Michael Scroggins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Steven Tuck v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Jaron C. Gibbs v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Anastacia Sanchez-Franco v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on February 28, 2017 11:02 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions